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Cooperating in Africa's sustainable structural transformation: policymaking capacity and the role of emerging economies*

Seung-Jin Baek

Economic Affairs Officer, baek@un.org

United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia

P.O. Box 11-8575, Riad el-Solh Square, Beirut 11-8575, Lebanon

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ABSTRACT

Most African countries today are pursuing one or both of the following policy agendas as they strive towards a sustainable transition: 1) a global normative agenda moving away from traditional patterns of economic growth and toward a greater emphasis on sustainable development (2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development), and 2) a regional context-dependent development policy agenda that entails the achievement of a more radical structural transformation (Agenda 2063). Having identified these two overlapping policy agendas, both of which are aimed at moving away from an exclusive focus on economic growth, this article explores these development viewpoints with particular focus on capacity building in policymaking (the non-financial aspect), and the need for these to be further supported by more aggressive global partnership efforts (the financial aspect). By doing so, we are able to examine some transformation experiences in Africa as well as policy options that envisage greater inclusiveness, equality and sustainability.

I. Policy mix toward sustainable structural transformation

Over the last five decades, several African countries have made remarkable progress in sustaining positive economic growth, while also improving their performance in social indicators such as health and education. Real GDP volume in Africa as a whole increased by 655 per cent between 1970 and 2016, which is more than three times the global increase over the same period of 211 per cent (Baek, 2018). The African continent is thus increasingly referred to as the new growth engine of the world as many African countries are growing more rapidly than high-income countries in the global North. Notwithstanding their tremendous progress, the 'grow first and redistribute later' strategy has been a dominant development paradigm.

The experience of many parts of Africa, where radical economic growth has been associated with a number of countervailing trends, is instructive. In sub-Saharan Africa, nearly 70 per cent of jobs are considered vulnerable, and youth and women labour market participation is still very low (ECA et al., 2016) and while extreme poverty (classified as living on US\$1.25 per day or less) decreased by 14 per cent over the period 1990–2012, a further 109 million people were classified as living in extreme poverty. This vulnerability in the labour market, together with persistent levels of poverty, suggests that much of the benefit of economic growth has been concentrated within small sections of the population.

A dominant economic development school of thought attributes relative underdevelopment in many African countries to a lack of structural transformation or the failure of such countries to significantly transform their low-productivity agrarian economies into high-productivity industrial ones (e.g. Timmer, 2007; McMillan and Rodrik, 2011; Lin, 2012). This school of thought argues that structural transformation efforts should target a move away from traditional views of development and towards labour-intensive export-led industrialisation, rather than directly jumping into services sector development.²

Therefore, many African countries have identified the structural transformation agenda as a development priority in their national and regional development frameworks. In January 2015, the heads of state and government of the African Union adopted Agenda 2063, a strategic framework for inclusive growth and structural transformation in Africa, and a strategy to optimise the use of the continent's resources for the benefit of all Africans (ECA et al., 2016, 29).

Yet, while Agenda 2063's particular focus on the structural transformation aspiration often lays the foundation for high and sustained economic growth, it is still keenly debated as to whether it can bring about environmentally sustainable growth (UNCTAD, 2012). According to the world development indicators (World Bank, 2018), the rising rates of greenhouse gas emissions, particularly in sub-Saharan African countries, have correlated with rising per capita GDP over the

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
2 Africa has recently experienced a prolonged era of de-industrialisation, which is evidenced by the decline and then stagnation in manufacturing value-added at around 11 per cent of GDP from 2012, while service sector value-added has increased since 2009 (Armah and Baek, 2018).

past half-century. This correlation implies that as long as per capita GDP continues to grow, so too will greenhouse gas emissions (Figure 1).

In a more analytical sense, the average growth rate of per capita emissions in OECD countries over the 1980s and 1990s was greater than that of sub-Saharan African countries but the trend has completely reversed between the two groups since 2000. It can be argued that sub-Saharan Africa has been able to sustain economic transformation over recent years through

greater increases of emissions of carbon dioxide than that of the advanced group.³ Given the relatively low share of manufacturing contributing to the GDP of many African countries, carbon-driven industrialisation has been substantially based on a narrow range of primary commodities, particularly natural resources including fossil fuels and metallic minerals (Schoneveld and Zoomers, 2015). The current transformation pattern in much of Africa may be environmentally unsustainable in this regard.

Figure 1. The growth trend of carbon dioxide emissions and per capita GDP: OECD versus sub-Saharan Africa, 1961–2014



Source: Author's own elaboration on the basis of the world development indicators (World Bank 2019)

Structural transformation strategies, while maintaining environmental conservation, are closely associated with the normative idea of sustainable development (Castro, 2004; Hull, 2008). Initially pioneered by the Brundtland Commission, the concept of sustainable development has emerged in relation to recent environmental challenges, prompting a rethink of the development paradigm. Agenda 21, the outcome document from the Earth Summit held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, called for the integration of environmental and developmental concerns. Subsequently, in 2012, the Rio +20 Conference urged UN member states to increase their mainstreaming of sustainable development at all levels (UN, 2012). This normative idea was later institutionalised in 2015 in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (UN, 2015), which reinforced all responsible and accountable governments and other actors to integrate economic, social and environmental aspects and recognise their interlinkages, so as to achieve in full sustainable development.

Reflecting the core of the two agendas, each having its own development goals and somewhat different aspirations, the central objective of this article is therefore to explore several important questions. Is it feasible to simultaneously achieve economic, social and environmental sustainability in the process of structural transformation? If yes, what approach

should African countries adopt in order to maximise the synergies between these two agendas, given the limited financial resources for implementations? The following two sections address these with particular focus on the role of policymaking and partnership.

II. Policymaking capacity matters most

Many African countries have their own long-term (50 years)⁴ development frameworks aimed at structurally transforming economies, and moving away from an exclusive focus on economic growth (Agenda 2063). Meanwhile, at the global level, the normative idea of sustainable development further urges African governments to advance the economic, social and environmental dimensions of sustainable development (2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development; hereinafter referred to as 2030 Agenda). Thus, a crucial difference exists. Agenda 2063 focuses on the structural transformation of the African continent towards diversified economies with an inclusive economic and political transformation. The 2030 Agenda is a development plan of action for people, the planet and prosperity that is anchored to the principle of sustainable development in its three dimensions: social, economic and environmental.

3 Averaged (1980–1999) growth rate of per capita greenhouse gas emissions in OECD countries is -.253 while growth rate in sub-Saharan Africa is -1.225, which can translate into the .625 gap in averaged growth rates between the two groups. However, the figures (averaged 2000–2014) are -.847 in OECD countries and .378 in sub-Saharan Africa, which implies that OECD countries have reduced their per

capita level of emission whereas sub-Saharan African countries have increased the emission level (mainly due to their industrialisation efforts). The gap in averaged growth rates since 2000 between the two groups has widened to 1.225.

4 These comprise five 10-year implementation plans; the first 10-year plan covers the period 2013–2023.

Table 1. The extent of convergence between the 2030 Agenda and Agenda 2063

2030 Agenda (SDGs)* by United Nations	Agenda 2063 by African Union
SDG 1: End poverty in all its forms everywhere	Goal 1: A high standard of living, quality of life and wellbeing for all
SDG 2: End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition, and promote sustainable agriculture	Goal 5: Modern agriculture for increased productivity and production
SDG 3: Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages	Goal 3: Healthy and well-nourished citizens
SDG 4: Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all	Goal 2: Well-educated citizens and skills revolution underpinned by science, technology and innovation
SDG 5: Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls	Goal 18: Engaged and empowered youth and children
SDG 6: Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all	Goal 17: Full gender equality in all spheres of life
SDG 7: Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable, and modern energy for all	Goal 7: Environmentally sustainable climate resilient economies and communities
SDG 8: Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment, and decent work for all	Goal 4: Transformed economies and job creation
SDG 9: Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization, and foster innovation	Goal 10: World-class infrastructure that criss-crosses Africa
SDG 11: Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient, and sustainable	
SDG 10: Reduce inequality within and among countries	Goal 1: A high standard of living, quality of life and wellbeing for all
SDG 12: Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns	n/a
SDG 13: Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts	Goal 5: Environmentally sustainable climate resilient economies and communities
SDG 14: Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas, and marine resources for sustainable development	Goal 6: Blue/ ocean economy for accelerated economic growth
SDG 15: Protect, restore, and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, halt and reverse land degradation, and halt biodiversity loss	
SDG 16: Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions at all levels	Goal 11: Democratic values, practices, universal principles of human rights, justice and the rule of law entrenched Goal 12: Capable institutions and transformed leadership in place at all levels Goal 13: Peace, security, and stability are preserved Goal 14: A stable and peaceful Africa Goal 15: A fully functional and operational African peace and security architecture
SDG 17: Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development	Goal 9: Key continental financial and monetary institutions established and functional Goal 19: Africa as a major partner in global affairs and peaceful co- existence
n/a	Goal 8: United Africa (federal or confederate)
n/a	Goal 16: African Cultural Renaissance is pre-eminent

Source: Author's own elaboration

* 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) constitute the core of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

Following the global adoption of both agendas, African governments began the process of designing national development planning frameworks that are aligned with both development initiatives. The new global and regional

development agendas are timely, but their implementation will be no easy task for African countries.


In more detail, Agenda 2063 has 7 aspirations, 20 goals, 34 priority areas, 171 national targets, 85 continental targets and 246 indicators, while the 2030 Agenda comprises 17 goals, 169

targets and 230 indicators, many of which overlap. The sheer volume of goals, targets and indicators embodied in both agendas thus suggests that the process of mainstreaming sustainable structural transformation into national development plans will be complicated for many African countries (SDSN, 2018). Accordingly, the effective implementation of both agendas should be supported by the mapping of detailed goals, targets and indicators.

There are indeed significant overlapping areas between both agendas, particularly in terms of their goals. In terms of

target levels, the 2030 Agenda goals 2, 5, 7 and 16 fully overlap with those of Agenda 2063, while other 2030 Agenda goals 10, 13, 14 and 15 have a low level of overlap (Figure 2). This goal-level mapping analysis sheds light on the exploration of potential correlations between structural transformation and sustainable development. In this regard, achieving both agendas entails two overlapping policy goals and hence their simultaneous implementation in national development plans.

Figure 2. Convergence analysis between the 2030 Agenda and Agenda 2063



Source: Author's own elaboration on the basis of ECA (2017)

Nonetheless, designing an integrated set of development goals still raises questions concerning how the prioritisation of the three dimensions of sustainable development affects outcomes in terms of structural transformation and vice versa, or which policy mix would have the most beneficial impact on Africa's environmentally structured transformation process. Realising the aspirations of both agendas would thus require strengthened policymaking capacities to analyse the inter- and intra-sectoral impacts of policy initiatives (Willis, 2016). The interaction analysis is rendered more complicated by the fact that various intra-dynamics among the multi-dimensions of sustainable development have significantly affected the processes of structural transformation (Baek, 2017; 2018). Indeed, there are three potential trade-offs and synergies within the sustainable development domain itself: economic growth versus social inclusion; economic growth versus environmental sustainability; and social inclusion versus environmental sustainability.

These multiple interactions have been recognised in relevant previous literature, but little is known about the nature and extent of such trade-offs and synergies (Saboori and Sulaiman, 2013; Spaier et al., 2017). Without filling such policymaking capacity gaps, it is very difficult to examine Africa's development strategies and whether these are designed to promote a structural transformation initiative or to mitigate

the effects of trade-offs and maximise the effects of synergies. This is an essential area where evidence-based analysis of structural effects (trade-offs and synergies) of key policies should be supported by development partners (Armah and Baek, 2018).

One of the few studies exploring the effects of trade-offs and synergies between the three dimensions of sustainable development and linking to structural transformation was conducted by Armah and Baek (2019) using panel data for twenty-nine African countries for the period 1995–2011. They found that a silo approach that focuses on one dimension at the expense of another has a less optimal impact on structural transformation, which challenges the dominant development paradigm of the 'grow first and redistribute/clean later' strategy. Rather, an inclusive and sustainable structural transformation agenda would require tackling the economic, social and environmental dimensions of sustainable development in an integrated way. These results were further supported by a structural equation modelling approach, pointing out that the total contribution of environmental initiatives to Africa's structural transformation agenda is greater than that of a structural transformation agenda that is led by economic growth strategies. This econometric approach also explained that prioritising social development in African countries may be the most expeditious pathway to structural transformation.

Furthermore, implementing both development initiatives would also hinge upon the institutional capacity for planning and coordinating interventions, adequate monitoring and reporting. In effect, the coordinated efforts of the cabinet, national parliaments, local authorities, academia, civil society, the private sector and development partners are essential to ensure smooth operations and effective delivery of services, monitoring and reporting. The lack of institutional capacity (coordination across and within implementing entities such as ministries and agencies), however, remains a significant challenge in several African governments (ECA, 2016).⁵ Therefore, efforts should be scaled up significantly to identify the most appropriate institutional architecture to facilitate effective implementation of the two agendas. This could help many African countries to explore policy options in an inclusive, equitable and sustainable manner.

III. The role of emerging economies in financing for sustainable structural transformation

Recognising the need of policymaking capacity to integrate both agendas and then mainstream them into national planning frameworks, I now focus attention on exploring this from a different angle, namely financing for sustainable structural transformation in Africa. In effect, the financial resources required considerably exceed what is currently available. UNCTAD (2018a) claims that the total investment needs for developing countries to realise the 2030 Agenda are estimated at about US\$3.9 trillion per year, with current investment levels falling short of that by some US\$1.4 trillion. Given the additional need for financial resources to realise Agenda 2063, achieving these two normative agendas with a business-as-usual approach remains highly unlikely.

In this context, the third Financing for Development conference held in Addis Ababa, from 13–16 July 2015 was the culmination of a multi-stakeholder process that began in October 2014. With the aim of securing international agreement to an agenda for financing global development over the next fifteen years, the process concluded with the adoption of the (non-binding) Addis Ababa Action Agenda (AAAA). The conference set out to measure progress and the challenges faced in the implementation of the 2002 Monterrey Consensus and the 2001 Doha Declaration, address emerging issues in development financing, and to bolster the so far weak financing for development follow-up processes.

The AAAA provides a comprehensive set of policy actions for the development partners to finance sustainable development, transform the global economy and achieve the 2030 Agenda. It further offers a new global framework for financing sustainable development that aligns all financing flows and policies with economic, social and environmental priorities and ensures that financing is stable and sustainable.

Further to the ongoing global and regional development targets and objectives, the AAAA encompasses several new commitments by the development partners with particular focus on global partnerships. The role of global partnerships is thus worthy of careful review.

In essence, the strengthening of international cooperation and partnerships plays a key role in fulfilling the specific needs of many African countries though bridging financing gaps. This relates to the mobilisation of resources from all funding mechanisms for the implementation of Africa's priorities as defined in both agendas and further the areas of development that both African countries and their development partners should focus on, and how these can be exploited. In fact, the African Union estimates that an effective resource mobilisation strategy can contribute from 75 per cent to 90 per cent to the financing required for Agenda 2063. With this in mind, three particular resources mobilisation channels (i.e. trade, aid and illicit financial flows) are discussed below.

The first, and arguably most important of these channels, is trade. Promoting trade with African countries is something to which many development partners have made a major commitment through various multilateral trade negotiations and forms of preferential treatment (e.g. Aid for Trade Initiative and Non-Agricultural Market Access) (Klasen et al., 2016). Nonetheless, recent data show that the share of Africa's exports in the global market has continuously declined since 2012 when it stood at 2.7 per cent in 2012, at 2.6 per cent in 2014 and at 2.3 per cent in 2016 (WTO, 2018).⁶ This decline is partly due to an unfavourable movement in global commodity prices, which has a significant impact on investment and economic growth in Africa given the heavy dependence of many African countries on natural resources for export.

The second channel is official development assistance (ODA). In terms of continents, Africa continues to be the largest recipient of ODA. Net ODA disbursements from member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development–Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) to Africa increased from US\$10.4 billion in 2000 to US\$29.2 billion in 2014. As a share of total OECD-DAC disbursements, Africa received between 34 to 49 per cent during this period, or about 43 per cent on average (Armah and Baek, 2015).

However, most OECD-DAC countries do not meet their ODA commitment to contribute 0.7 per cent of their own gross national income (GNI). Indeed, in 2014, only five countries met their promised ODA target: Sweden (1.1 per cent); Luxembourg (1.07 per cent); Norway (0.99 per cent); Denmark (0.85 per cent); and United Kingdom (0.71 per cent). The total ODA from OECD-DAC countries reached only 0.29 per cent of the combined GNI, implying a gap of 0.41 per cent between the target and actual disbursements. Nonetheless, the increasing role of non-DAC donors has also been recognised.⁷

5 In the past, there has been a tendency to consider immediate benefits above all else, for example the economic benefits of increased oil production were not adequately weighed against the possible negative environmental and social effects.

6 The share of intra-African exports has increased, since 2012, from 13.46 per cent to 15.47 per cent in 2014 and to 17.60 per cent in 2016, while the share of exports from Africa to the rest of the world has declined from 86.54 per cent to 84.53 per cent and to 82.40 per cent over the same period. Such increased intra-trade activities were largely

benefited from the African Continental Free Trade Area agreement that removed tariffs on nearly 90 per cent of goods among the members (ESCSA, 2018).

7 There has been an increasing presence of non-DAC donors in terms of international development assistance: it increased from US\$11.8 billion in 2012 to US\$21.9 billion in 2016 (OECD, 2018). Although the share still accounts for 13.1 per cent in total, their development influence particularly in Africa is becoming greater (Mawdsley, 2010; Kim and Lightfoot, 2011; Gulrajani and Swiss, 2017).

With this huge gap unlikely to narrow in the near future, the quality of ODA and the use thereof requires serious review. There has been a broad consensus that the quality of aid would have greater potential to achieve value for aid money, eventually maximising its impact on the structural transformation process (Kharas, 2008). This is mainly because such quality can reinforce mutual accountability and ownership from both donors and recipients, which has also been empirically supported by a large body of literature (Jones and Tarp, 2016; Lin et al., 2019).

The third channel, which is particularly pertinent in the African context, is illicit financial flows.⁸ According to an Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) survey in 2015, Africa is estimated to have lost in excess of US\$1 trillion from the aggressive tax avoidance practices of multinational companies over the last sixty years (ECA, 2015). This means the continent is currently losing more than US\$50 billion annually, which is almost double the annual foreign aid flow to Africa and equivalent to 16 per cent of the continent's GDP.

Notwithstanding underperformance in terms of financial resources mobilisation channels, the emerging role of China in Africa's sustainable transformation has been remarkable; China has been Africa's largest trading partner for the past four years. Trade data show that the volume of Africa's trade with China reached US\$225 billion in 2015, which far surpassed the United States, the continent's second largest partner (Oxfam International, 2016). Furthermore, Chinese foreign direct investment to Africa is substantially increasing,⁹ with more than 10,000 Chinese firms now operating in Africa, a third of which are in manufacturing sectors (Jayaram et al., 2017). As China's search continues for natural resources to meet its own national demand for unabating industrial growth, even greater cooperation between these two continents is anticipated (Mohan, 2013).¹⁰

Although Africa has gained much from China's investment and engagement, Brautigam and Hwang (2016) raised concerns that, from 2000 to 2014, the Chinese government, banks and contractors issued US\$86.3 billion worth of loans to African governments and state-owned enterprises. These two researchers argue that such loan flows result in Africa currently being significantly indebted to China. China's African loans have skyrocketed especially in recent years, finally amounting to US\$143.3 billion in 2017. These loans are largely classified as non-official development aid such as export credits, suppliers' credits, commercial, and not concessional, among others.¹¹

As a result, around 15 per cent of sub-Saharan Africa's total debt is to the Chinese government (Mlambo, 2019). For instance, Kenya's debt to China is six times larger than to its second largest creditor, France (Chen and Nord, 2018).

Although this persistent debt burden has partly been offset by global debt relief initiatives, including Heavily Indebted Poor Countries and Multilateral Debt Relief, these cannot by themselves ensure sustainable debt management (Armah and Baek, 2015).

Recognising a potential debt trap, one way of fuelling Africa's transformation while minimising the demerits related to debt burden could be to focus attention on the investment areas that best stimulate the reallocation of resources from low to high-productivity sectors. Of all sectors, advances in technology and innovation are most likely to boost the manufacturing sector, which could become the heart of the structural transformation process as well as sustainable development (Gault and Zhang, 2010). Mindful of this, export-led development strategies favouring manufacturing sector development on the principle of comparative advantage stimulate growth which could, over time, cause sustainable transformation (Swiecki, 2017).

Such targeted partnership areas should also be supported by interventions that take the environment into consideration. Various studies (e.g. Collier and Venables, 2012; UNEP, 2015) have claimed that, relative to other continents, the potential for greening the economy is highest in Africa. This is based on the assumption that Africa would willingly jump from fossil fuels to green energy if it were to benefit from the diffusion of green technology already developed in the global West. For instance, the experiences of Norway and Sweden suggest that developing countries could decouple greenhouse gas emissions with current technological innovations, which means that they can improve human development, while attaining low levels of carbon dioxide emissions per capita (Armah and Baek, 2018). Also, Africa would have a geographical advantage in producing renewable energy sources, given its vast untapped natural resources as well as abundant sunshine. All these would therefore put the continent in a position to leverage synergies between environmental and structural transformation. In fact, some African countries including Ethiopia are already among the global frontrunners in this arena.

This discourse should remind us of the great potential for new partnerships with other emerging economies such as Brazil, Russia and India, as an alternative source of financing for development that improves the capacity for domestic (and regional) resources mobilisation. Negotiating new partnerships in a way that is mutually beneficial for donors and African countries remains a prerequisite. African countries should therefore proactively seek new partnerships prioritising their own development areas that could expedite structural transformation in a sustainable fashion. Meanwhile, African countries should also make an effort to maintain and strengthen partnerships with traditional development partners. Balancing

8 Illicit financial outflows can be defined as money that is illegally earned, transferred or utilised. These funds typically originate from three broad sources: 1) commercial tax evasion, trade mis-invoicing and abusive transfer pricing; 2) criminal activities, including the drug trade, human trafficking, illegal arms dealing and smuggling of contraband; and 3) bribery and theft by corrupt government officials (ECA, 2015).

9 It increased from US\$16 billion in 2011 to US\$40 billion in 2016 (UNCTAD, 2018b). However, China's capital-intensive investment (or sometimes speculative investments) in African extractive industries reflects a temporary advantage in the trade balance of a few African oil-

exporting countries while rendering a greater disadvantage to oil importers in the region (Zafar, 2007).

10 At the Beijing Summit of the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation, President Xi Jinping said 'China will provide US\$60 billion in financial support to Africa and the support will be provided in the form of government assistance as well as investment and financing by financial institutions and companies.'

11 Data is based on the China Africa Research Initiative, led by Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, available from <http://www.sais-cari.org/data-chinese-loans-and-aid-to-africa>.

between emerging and traditional partners could well be crucial in determining whether African countries' efforts toward structural transformation are anchored by the principles of sustainable development.

IV. Conclusion

Overall, several African countries have made substantial progress in advancing their socio-economic development in the past decade, but the benefits of rapid growth have not been evenly and broadly shared. As a partial consequence, many African countries have prioritised structural transformation as a development objective. This is reflected in two internationally agreed commitments: Agenda 2063 and the 2030 Agenda, with the latter going further regarding environmentally sustainable development. Of the many policy implications, I chose to focus on those related to the field of development planning with an emphasis on policymaking capacity as well as on areas of resources mobilisation that can be improved by strengthened global partnerships.

The first important insight gained from the mapping analysis is that the structural transformation in many African countries can benefit from an integrated approach to development planning, consistent with the global normative sustainable development framework. Africa's development planning capacity, however, appears substantially weak; several African countries are struggling to mainstream development priorities and policies in their national planning frameworks (ECA, 2016; Armah and Baek, 2015; 2018). This implies a need to break institutional silos, thus strengthening sectoral (i.e. horizontal) and sub-national (i.e. vertical) coordination within and among implementing entities. Nonetheless, no analytical view on development planning would be intelligible without improved access to data, the reliability of which depends on the capacity of the relevant national statistics office.¹²

In this new age of Africa's quest for sustainable structural transformation, multi-stakeholder partnerships should remain one of the most critical financing means of mobilising internal and external resources, as emphasised strongly in the AAAA. Scaling up financing for sustainable structural transformation is required, given that this is no longer feasible with a business-as-usual financing approach. The higher the quality (strategic) of the global partnership, the more likely the two agendas will be simultaneously implemented. For instance, strategic partnerships should focus on the areas that can stimulate economic activities through reallocating resources from low- to high-productivity sectors, especially the manufacturing sector in many African countries. For this area, emerging partners will need to take an active role in supporting Africa's transition toward sustainability and its operationalisation of overlapping agendas.

In the next few decades, sustainable structural transformation outcomes in African countries will thus be shaped greatly by both development planning for integrating multiple development agendas in a more effective way and financing for development through strengthened global

partnerships among African countries, and traditional and emerging development partners.

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